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Whose Vision of Human Flourishing Reflects The Common Good?

Whose Vision of Human Flourishing Reflects The Common Good?

Last updated on: August 26, 2026 at 10:26 am by Dennis Knapp

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Whose Vision of Human Flourishing Reflects The Common Good? 2026-08-26T10:26:45-06:00 Dennis Knapp

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Applying the Common Good Consistently to Abortion, Sexuality, Marriage, and the Rights of Children

In my previous article, I asked Henry Karlson for a principled criterion distinguishing between social-justice questions that implicate the common good and sexual, familial, and “culture war” questions that he treats as largely private. Karlson answers this question in his recent piece, Charity Begins With Justice in Public Life, in which he affirms:

Social justice is about creating the conditions for the members of society to flourish.

Therefore, to promote this flourishing, government “must establish laws, promote regulations, and use its funds” to create those conditions. I agree that government may sometimes restrict individual freedom to protect justice and the common good.

That clarification raises a deeper question: What constitutes human flourishing, and whose flourishing and rights must government consider?

Once we agree that government may restrict individual freedom to promote human flourishing, appeals to “freedom” cannot automatically exclude abortion, sexuality, marriage, or family from legislation. Traditional Christian understandings of flourishing deserve consideration under the same standard Karlson applies to progressive concerns. This includes asking whether children possess claims or rights that place moral limits on adult autonomy.

The question, then, is not whether government may promote flourishing, but whose account of human flourishing is correct, whose rights must be considered, and what limits government should observe in pursuing the common good.

Karlson’s Standard: Government May Shape Society Toward Flourishing

According to Karlson, justice precedes charity in public life. Therefore, government ought to create social conditions conducive to human flourishing. This means using laws, regulations, and public spending to promote those conditions while also addressing structures that impede flourishing. Specifically, he identifies racism, sexism, ageism, religious bigotry, worker exploitation, healthcare, environmental concerns, and DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) as areas in which government may legitimately intervene to promote human flourishing.

The implication for freedom is important. Karlson does not treat individual freedom as absolute. Environmental regulations restrict property and economic freedom. Labor regulations restrict contractual freedom. Anti-discrimination laws restrict freedom of association and business decisions. Yet Karlson considers such restrictions potentially legitimate because they advance justice and flourishing. Therefore, the fact that a law restricts freedom cannot by itself establish that the law violates the common good.

The Question Has Changed: What Is Human Flourishing?

Now, let’s consider the concept of “flourishing,” because the term does not define itself. For example, some people see sexual autonomy as an expression of human flourishing, while others see sexual fidelity. Some think access to abortion promotes human flourishing, while others see flourishing better reflected in protecting unborn life. Still others emphasize individual autonomy, while others emphasize stable family structures. Government cannot resolve these disagreements merely by repeating the word “flourishing.”

Flourishing requires judgments about more foundational questions, such as human nature, human dignity, rights, health, family, sexuality, parenthood, responsibility, and justice. The common good must consider not merely the desires of autonomous adults but also the interests and possible rights of people affected by their choices. Therefore, we must ask: What makes one conception of human flourishing true and another mistaken?

With that question in mind, I present three thought experiments designed to test Karlson’s criterion consistently. These range from serious proposals to deliberately provocative hypotheticals. Their purpose is to test the principle, not to claim that every proposal represents the only possible policy.

Thought Experiment One: A Constitutional Right to Life for the Unborn

Social justice is about creating the conditions for the members of society to flourish, making sure they are not being oppressed.

What is the unborn child?

If unborn children are human beings possessing dignity and rights, and continued existence is required for every form of flourishing, then abortion eliminates the child’s opportunity to flourish. Therefore, protecting the unborn from intentional killing becomes a matter of justice rather than merely private morality.

Our U.S. Constitution currently contains 27 amendments. Some of these amendments have expanded or clarified legal protections for groups whose rights society previously failed to protect adequately. Women’s voting rights provide an obvious example.

Thought Experiment:

Why not a constitutional amendment recognizing the unborn as rights-bearing human beings?

I acknowledge that such an amendment would restrict access to abortion and therefore restrict some choices available to pregnant women. However, if we apply Karlson’s principle of flourishing, we must acknowledge that government already restricts freedom when necessary to protect other persons and advance justice. Therefore, “reproductive freedom” cannot settle the issue. The question becomes: Does another human being possess rights that limit that freedom?

Furthermore, we cannot consider the freedom of adults apart from the rights of children affected by adult choices. If flourishing justifies legal protection for vulnerable human beings, why would unborn human beings constitute an exception?

Thought Experiment Two: A License for Sexual Relations

Okay, time for some provocation…

Modern society routinely licenses activities when their irresponsible exercise can harm others and society has a legitimate interest in establishing minimum standards. Take driving as an example. Driving itself is not immoral, yet governments impose requirements such as a minimum age, demonstrated competency, and compliance with safety rules. Why? Because with driving, individual freedom intersects with risks to others and the common good.

Now consider sexual activity. Sexual intercourse can transmit infectious diseases, produce children, create parental obligations, and generate substantial healthcare costs. Sexual activity therefore represents one of those unusual private activities that can have profound consequences beyond the people immediately involved—including bringing an entirely new human being into existence.

Thought Experient:

Considering those consequences, why not require a license to engage in sexual activity? Such a license might require adulthood, basic education concerning consent and STIs, regular STI testing, and an understanding of parental responsibilities.

Obviously, serious objections immediately arise: privacy, enforcement, government intrusion, bodily autonomy, proportionality, and potential abuse. Those objections may ultimately make such a licensing regime unjustified. But that is precisely the point of the thought experiment. A particular form of government regulation can be unjustified without making the underlying behavior irrelevant to the common good.

If government may regulate private economic behavior because irresponsible conduct affects other people, why is sexual behavior categorically beyond regulation when it can also affect others—including children who do not yet exist when the choices are made?

Thought Experiment Three: Restore Male-Female Civil Marriage

Karlson and I both quote paragraph 1908 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which states that the common good includes “the right to establish a family.” Therefore, we must include marriage in any analysis of the common good. By marriage, I mean the traditional understanding of the union of male and female, a union naturally capable of generating children. Historically, marriage binds mothers and fathers to one another and to their children.

What public purpose does civil marriage serve?

If marriage exists merely to recognize adult romantic relationships, sexual complementarity appears difficult to justify. However, if marriage exists partly to organize procreation and bind children to their mothers and fathers, sexual complementarity becomes directly relevant. If so, then just as adults possess the right to establish a family, children possess rights within the family that adults establish. In other words, children possess rights that constrain how adults and government structure family institutions.

Thought Experiment:

Let’s say we overturned Obergefell v. Hodges. States would no longer face a federal constitutional requirement to license and recognize same-sex marriages and could again define civil marriage around male-female sexual complementarity. Of course, as with abortion access, this would restrict access to civil marriage as presently defined by limiting it to men and women.

However, applying Karlson’s principle, restrictions on freedom are not automatically unjust if government may structure institutions toward human flourishing. Marriage serves important human goods. Therefore, the relevant question is not simply whether a male-female definition of marriage restricts freedom, but whether that legal definition best protects and promotes the human goods marriage serves.

Children and the Meaning of Flourishing

Before wrapping up, a word on the rights of children. In most discussions of marriage, the focus typically falls on the adults who initially form the union. However, once that union produces dependent children, the equation changes. The couple who brought those children into the world now bears obligations toward them. These obligations include providing, to the extent possible, an environment conducive to their flourishing.

Regardless of what the social-science evidence ultimately establishes about the importance of a two-parent household composed of a mother and father, a more fundamental question arises for our purposes: Do children possess a legitimate interest—or even a right—in having relationships with both their mother and father?

If they do, then their flourishing must become part of our analysis of the common good. Government cannot guarantee every child a mother and father; circumstances sometimes make that impossible. But neither should government structure family institutions as though the interests of children begin only after adult choices have been satisfied. The interests of adults and children must both enter the equation.

And this brings us back to the question with which we began: Whose vision of human flourishing? If Karlson believes government may shape social conditions to promote human flourishing, then we cannot define flourishing solely in terms of adult autonomy. We must also ask what children need to flourish and whether marriage, as a public institution, should reflect those needs. Once we ask that question, the debate over marriage is no longer simply about restricting adult freedom. It is about which understanding of marriage best serves the common good—including the good of the children whose lives that institution helps to shape.

Final Thoughts: Whose Vision of Human Flourishing?

Returning to Karlson’s proposition, government may use law to create social conditions conducive to human flourishing. On that, we agree. However, as I have shown in this piece, determining what constitutes human flourishing requires careful consideration. We cannot simply equate flourishing with whatever political project we ourselves desire, particularly when appeals to the common good can justify limits on individual freedom.

Moreover, the three thought experiments expose the need for consistent answers. Many of the policies Karlson considers legitimate in the pursuit of justice and human flourishing restrict individual freedom. So do the three examples I have offered. A constitutional amendment protecting unborn rights restricts freedom. Sexual regulation could restrict freedom. A male-female definition of civil marriage restricts freedom.

But acknowledging that fact does not settle whether any of these policies are just or unjust. If restricting freedom automatically disqualified a policy from serving the common good, the same objection would apply to many of the policies Karlson himself supports. We must instead determine what constitutes genuine human flourishing, whether a particular policy actually promotes it, and whether the restriction on freedom is proportionate to the good being protected.

“That restricts freedom” cannot end the argument. It begins the argument.

So, I must ask: If government may restrict freedom to promote human flourishing, by what principle do we determine which vision of human flourishing government may promote—and are we willing to apply that principle equally when the resulting policies challenge our own conception of freedom?